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KEYNOTE ADDRESS:
A COMMUNITY OF REASON AND PdGHTS*
INTRODUCTION
William Michael Treanor
Dean, Fordham Law School
KEYNOTE ADDRESS
Harold Hongju Koh
Dean, Yale Law School
DEAN TREANOR: I am delighted that this Symposium is being held
here at Fordham. I would particularly like to recognize Catherine Powell
for the extraordinary job she has done in putting it together. It is just
amazing. These are the most important issues that we, as lawyers and legal
academics, face today. This is a conference that I think, overall, has two
overarching themes in the various programs.
One is a separation of powers question: Which part of the government
makes decisions about things like war and treaties? The other overarching
theme is, how does the question of constitutional interpretation intersect
with international law?
We have had law schools in this country for more than two hundred
years. The most pressing issues change over time. But these are the most
pressing issues today, and they are going to be the most pressing issues for
all of our lifetimes. Partly, that is because of globalization and the fact that
the intersections between nations are at a level that was inconceivable a
short time ago. Part of it is because, in the wake of 9/11, we have a whole
series of questions concerning the war on terrorism and relations between
foreign states, which are at a level of great urgency. So these are the most
important questions that we have.
Catherine and all of you have put together a program that brings together
the most extraordinary speakers. It is really jaw-dropping for me to look at
all of the people who will be appearing here today and tomorrow. Our
keynote speaker is foremost among them: Harold Koh. There are just a
couple of things that I want to say about Dean Koh before I turn matters
over to him.
* This is a lightly edited and footnoted version of the Keynote Address that was delivered on
October 4, 2007, at Fordham University School of Law.
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First, of the 184 deans of American law schools, Harold is my favorite. I
think, frankly, all of us can probably say that. He is my favorite, in part, not
just because he is this great world human-rights champion, but also for
reasons that are totally family-related. Harold's father-in-law, Bill Fisher,
was a very distinguished graduate of Fordham Law School who went on to
a terrific career in business and who really embodied the Fordham ideals.
Fordham always meant very much to him. Harold is very much a part of
the Fordham Law School family. He wears the Fordham Law School tie.
Secondly, our Leitner Center, which Tracy Higgins and Martin Flaherty
started originally as the Crowley Program, is one of our cosponsors. It has
gone to warp speed in the last few years with the help of Jim and Sandra
Leitner. Jim Leitner and his father were reading Storming the Court,1
which is the story of how a group of remarkable Yale law students,
including our own Catherine Powell, brought suit against the United States
government concerning the treatment of Haitians trying to come to the
United States. Harold Koh, as a young law professor, was the pivotal figure
in moving this forward. Jim Leitner said, "We should be doing this at
Fordham," and gave us a $1 million grant to start a clinic like that. So I
have very personal reasons, in terms of Fordham governance, to be grateful
to Dean Koh.
Third, and the reason why you all are here, is because he is somebody of
vision and a leader in the human rights area who is really without peer. I
can testify to that from personal experience. My first job as an attorney
after I clerked was to work in the Iran-Contra Special Prosecutor's Office.
One of the things I was trying to figure out was why what Oliver North and
others had done violated the law and was inconsistent with the
constitutional framework.
Twenty years ago, there had not been a lot of careful thought about these
issues. What I found-and I did a lot of the basic background work in
framing a conspiracy charge-was that there had been interference with
normal government operations. The Bible, for me, was Harold's book, The
National Security Constitution2-the most remarkable, the most thoughtful,
the most careful, serious, and deeply committed work of scholarship in the
area. It was fabulous. I still, more than twenty years later, think of it as the
absolute model of committed and flawless scholarship.
Since that time, I have followed Harold's career. When I was at the
Office of Legal Counsel, where I had the privilege of working with Martin
Lederman, a remarkable and brilliant attorney who was on our last panel,
we had the privilege of working with Harold when he was the Assistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights. What he did there was breathtaking.
It was government service of the highest order. He is someone who is so
profoundly committed to the cause of human rights and to getting the
1. BRANDT GOLDSTEIN, STORMING THE COURT: How A BAND OF YALE LAW STUDENTS
SUED THE PRESIDENT-AND WON (2005).
2. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990).
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United States on the right side of the crusade for human rights that he was
an inspiration to all of us.
I introduce a lot of people here. I have never had a greater privilege than
introducing Harold Hongju Koh.
DEAN KOH: Thank you, Dean Bill Treanor. You are not only a dear
friend, but also one of the most outstanding law deans of America. We are
very lucky at Yale Law School; remarkably, six of the law deans in New
York happen to be graduates of our school: Brooklyn, Columbia, CUNY,
Fordham, Hofstra, and NYU. All of these wonderful deans are good friends
of mine, but nobody more regularly impresses me, with his passionate
commitment to scholarship and humane legal education, than Dean Bill
Treanor.
As Bill said, I last came to this room to give the Levine Lecture, which
was around the time of my late father-in-law Bill Fisher's fiftieth
anniversary of graduating from Fordham Law School, and so I dedicated
that lecture to him. Bill Fisher attended Fordham Law at night while
working downtown at a business; he later became president of Universe
Tankships. He had tremendous loyalty and affection for this school. He
had the privilege of going with members of his law school class down to
Washington to be sworn into the Supreme Court bar, accompanied by then-
Judge, formerly Dean, Bill Mulligan of the Second Circuit. He often
described that day to me as one of his happiest days ever as a lawyer, so I
feel delighted to be here, remembering him today.
As I look over this crowd, I see so many friends from Fordham's law
faculty-Justice Richard Goldstone, and Professors Marty Flaherty, Tracy
Higgins, Grdinne de Biirca, and, most of all, my former student Catherine
Powell, who has done such an extraordinary job both in building up the
Leitner Center and in putting on this terrific conference. So I feel very
good looking out over this crowd and seeing all my friends.
This conference asks how to set the terms of engagement between
international law and the Constitution. As Dean Treanor said, that topic
encompasses two issues: first, enforceability of international and foreign
law in U.S. courts; and second, the extent to which international law binds
the President in the war on terror.
My keynote remarks today are entitled "A Community of Reason and
Rights." I would like to take as my touchstone the now-famous quote by
Chief Justice John Roberts from his Supreme Court confirmation hearing:
"[L]ooking at foreign law for support [in construing the U.S. Constitution]
is like looking out over a crowd and picking out your friends. You can find
them, they're there. And that actually expands the discretion of the judge..
I think that's a misuse of precedent, not a correct use of precedent."'3
3. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.




A few months later, at his confirmation hearings, Justice Samuel Alito
was asked the same question. He similarly said,
I don't think that it's appropriate or useful to look to foreign law in
interpreting the provisions of our Constitution. I think the framers would
be stunned by the idea that the Bill of Rights is to be interpreted by taking
a poll of the countries of the world. . . .The framers did not want
Americans to have the rights of people in France or the rights of people in
Russia or ...Europe . . . They wanted them to have the rights of
Americans.4
In response, I am reminded of a comment made recently by Aharon
Barak, who is the president of the Israeli Supreme Court. He said, "What's
wrong with looking out over a crowd and picking out friends? Should I
look out over the crowd and pick out my enemies?"'5
Ladies and Gentlemen, that, in a nutshell, is my thesis today. In this
crowd I see many friends who are on the panels today and tomorrow. I
don't agree with all of you all the time, or even most of the time; your
views do not control mine. But I learn from you. I gain value from your
insights. I listen to you. I incorporate your insights to improve my
reasoning. I do not simply ignore what you have to say or act as if it is
irrelevant to my own decision-making process. Why? Because you are all
part of what I would consider to be a community of reason and rights that I
must engage if I plan to discuss a subject like this responsibly. On
reflection, I believe, that position completely answers the two Justices and
other commentators who take the opposite position. To explain why, let me
divide my remarks into four parts:
First, what is the state of the debate about international and foreign law in
U.S. courts? What is and what is not contested? Second, if this debate is
primarily about legitimacy, what are the four perspectives on legitimacy
that we must address? Third, I would like to explain my proposed
standard-looking to a community of reason and rights. Finally, I will
apply that standard in a way that I think cuts the Gordian knot of
legitimacy.
At bottom, this lecture rests on two simple ideas: First, that there is
nothing inherently wrong with looking out over a crowd of ideas and
picking out our friends. Of course, you should not be bound by their views,
but neither should you ignore them. Second, what makes looking to foreign
and international law a legitimate activity for domestic judges is that they
are not selectively looking at those foreign and international precedents to
help them reach a particular desired preordained outcome. The question is
4. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 471 (2006) [hereinafter Alito Confirmation Hearing]
(statement of Judge Samuel A. Alito), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 109_senate hearings&docid=f:25429.wais.
5. Aharon Barak, President, Israeli Supreme Court, Address to Students at Yale Law
School (Sept. 28, 2007). Aharon Barak's address was not recorded or transcribed.
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whether, in choosing between two possible legal positions, either of which
is a plausible interpretation of a constitutional provision, a judge should
look to a legal analysis founded in a community of reason and rights to see
whether there is a position that would better inform his or her constitutional
interpretation. If such a clear position exists, it is not illegitimate for the
judge to follow it. Far from it, informing one's judgment by looking to
those other bodies of learning is exactly how a prudent judge should
proceed.
So let me ask first: What is not contested in this debate? A lot of
scholars have written about this subject, and many of the justices have now
talked about it. What is not contested is that U.S. courts have historically
looked to international and foreign law in construing the Constitution.
There is just too much history and case citation that can be marshaled to
establish this point, although the courts have not found such foreign
precedent to be binding in most cases. Better known to many of you are the
famous recent cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court has cited foreign law
in its opinions: for example, Atkins v. Virginia,6 declaring unconstitutional
the execution of a mentally retarded prisoner; Roper v. Simmons,7 which
declared unconstitutional the attempted execution of a person who was
under eighteen at the time of committing his offense; and Lawrence v.
Texas,8 which invalidated same-sex sodomy criminal laws in the state of
Texas. At the same time, the Court has also had a number of cases recently
involving international law-most prominently, two 9/11 cases, the Hamdi
case 9 and the Hamdan case1 0 -and three cases involving the relationship
between domestic courts and the International Court of Justice-the
Medellin case, I I Sanchez-Llamas,12 and Medellin 11.13 So like it or not,
U.S. courts have long looked to international and foreign law when
conducting constitutional interpretation.
Second, also not contested is the hierarchical place of treaty law within
the domestic legal hierarchy: below the Constitution, above state law, and
at the same level as federal statutes. It undeniably would be a violation of
the separation of powers for Congress to forbid judges from citing foreign
and international law in their opinions, as they sought to do in the now-
infamous Feeney Amendment.' 4 So bravo to Justice Scalia, who said that
such an amendment would be flatly unconstitutional, despite his strong
6. 536 U.S. 304, 316-17 n.21 (2002).
7. 543 U.S. 551, 577 (2005).
8. 539 U.S. 558, 573 (2003).
9. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
10. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
11. Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (per curiam).
12. Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
13. Medellin v. Texas, Nos. 06-984, 08-5573, 08-5574, 2008 WL 3821478 (U.S. Aug. 5,
2008) (per curiam).
14. Reaffirmation of American Independence Resolution, H.R. Res. 568, 108th Cong.
(2004) (seeking to restrict references to foreign law in interpreting federal law). The bill was
reintroduced in the House the next year. See H.R. Res. 97, 109th Cong. (2005).
2008]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
personal opinion that he himself does not believe it is proper to cite foreign
and international law in constitutional interpretation.
If these are the uncontested issues, what issues are contested? Let me
mention three: First, the hierarchical place of customary international law
in U.S. domestic law. That has been the subject of a long-standing debate
between the so-called "New Sovereigntists," including Jack Goldsmith and
Curtis Bradley, and myself, Gerry Neuman, now of Harvard, and Lou
Henkin of Columbia Law School. Second, is the citation of foreign and
international law somehow undemocratic because it expands judicial
discretion, as Chief Justice Roberts has asserted? And third, if a judge does
want to cite foreign and international law, what standards should she apply
to make this practice legitimate?
This conference addresses the legitimacy of this practice. Let me offer
four different perspectives on legitimacy: a comparative perspective, a
historical perspective, a constitutional perspective, and a jurisprudential
perspective. These perspectives should give you some sense of why it is
reasonable to look out over a crowd and listen to friendly ideas, particularly
if they belong to a common community of reason and rights.
First, let me explore the comparative perspective. Recently I have
discussed this issue with four famous foreign supreme court justices:
Richard Goldstone, a founding judge of the South African Constitutional
Court; Aharon Barak, the President of the Israeli Supreme Court; Dieter
Grimm of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, now a professor at
Humboldt University; and Rosalie Abella, currently sitting on the Supreme
Court of Canada. To each of these judges, I asked the same question: "Do
domestic judges in your country apply foreign and international law?" In
response, they all said, "We do it every single day. We do not even think
about it as controversial. We are amazed that Americans are so worked up
about what in our country is a nonissue."
On reflection, part of the reason that this practice is so uncontroversial
abroad may lie in the constitutional provisions of different countries'
constitutions, some of which have textual provisions for incorporating
international law into domestic law. Recently I saw Veton Surroi, a
member of the Unity Team of Kosovar Albanians that is negotiating in New
York regarding Kosovo's final status. Surroi is an extraordinarily articulate
person, the former editor of the Pristina newspaper Koha Ditore. As most
of you know, Kosovo would like very much to become the world's 193rd
nation. When I was in the U.S. State Department, Veton and I both
participated at the Kosovo status negotiations in Rambouillet in 1999.
When I heard him talk about the search for Kosovo's independence, I asked
Surroi whether the Kosovars would issue a declaration of independence
from the former Yugoslavia. He said to me, "Many of us will draft the
declaration of independence. There will be no single Thomas Jefferson."
But tellingly, he said, echoing the words of our own 1776 Declaration of
Independence, "We plan to give 'decent respect to the opinions of mankind'
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and declare fealty to international law and human rights as our first step
toward gaining international acceptance for our new country."
In doing so, the Kosovars would follow in the steps of the 192nd country
in the world, Timor-Leste, also known as the government of East Timor.
When Timor-Leste joined the United Nations in 2002, the first thing the
country did was sign the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In his
maiden speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Xanana
Gusmdo said, "We are aware that we will be serving the interests of our
people only if we honor our international commitments by signing the
relevant conventions and treaties which safeguard our sovereignty and our
interests." In other words, new nations joining the brotherhood of nations
tend to invoke the consistency of their domestic law with international law
as a way of gaining international respectability.
For example, take John Jay, the first U.S. Chief Justice, former
ambassador to France, who says, in Chisholm v. Georgia that the United
States had, by "taking a place among the nations of the earth, become
amenable to the law of nations." 15 Former Secretary of State John Marshall
said, in 1815, that absent a contrary statute, "the Court is bound by the law
of nations which is a part of the law of the land."' 16 In McCulloch v.
Maryland, Marshall famously said that "we must never forget that it is a
constitution we are expounding."' 17 But he added: "If any one proposition
could command the universal assent of mankind, . . . it would be this-that
the government of the Union, though limited in its powers, is supreme
within its sphere of action." 18 In other words, in construing the fledgling
U.S. Constitution, the Justices were making reference to principles that
might command "the universal assent of mankind." In an interdependent
world, these Justices were saying, the United States must pay decent respect
to the opinions of mankind in construing our own law. By the turn of the
nineteenth century, Justice Horace Gray had announced that "when ...
there is no written law upon the subject, the duty still rests upon the judicial
tribunals [to] ascertain[] and declar[e] what the law is"-including
international and foreign law-"whenever it becomes necessary to do so."19
That very language is quoted again by Justice Gray in his famous opinion in
the Paquete Habana case. 20
So what was the "originalist" vision of international law that these
justices were talking about? The notion was compliance with what the
Romans called jus gentium, a law common to all mankind. Professor
Jeremy Waldron of NYU, in an article in the Harvard Law Review several
years ago, describes the jus gentium as "the common law of mankind, not
15. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 474 (1793).
16. The Nereide, 13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 388, 423 (1815).
17. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
18. Id. at 405 (emphasis added).
19. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163 (1895).
20. 175 U.S. 677, 714 (1900) ("[I]t is the duty of this court, sitting as the highest prize
court of the United States, and administering the law of nations, to declare and adjudge that
the capture was unlawful, and without probable cause .... ).
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just on issues between sovereigns but on legal issues generally .. . . It
was.., a sort of consensus among judges, jurists, and lawmakers around
the world"2 '-by which he means a community of reason and rights-
regarding legal rules.
To see that the first Justices applied an American jurisprudence based on
reason and rights, look to William Blackstone, whose Commentaries
describe the law of nations as "a system of rules, deducible by natural
reason, and established by universal consent.., to insure the observance of
justice and good faith, in that intercourse which must frequently occur
between two or more independent states, and the individuals belonging to
each."'22 In other words, what Blackstone describes is not an inter-national
law-a law between states, in the strict Benthamite sense-but rather, a
kind of transnational law for a modem time.
What about our constitutional history and doctrine? Professor Sarah
Cleveland's recent article, Our International Constitution, in the Yale
Journal of International Law thoroughly reviews the doctrine to describe
how the Supreme Court has used international law traditionally to construe
the Constitution in three ways: first, direct incorporation; second, as a
background principle of constitutional construction; and third, to construe
individual rights provisions of the Constitution. 23
So the point that should emerge from this comparative and historical look
is that use and reference to international and foreign law in constitutional
interpretation is not only a settled practice in most parts of the world, but
was also a settled practice in the United States until quite recently.
Given this long history, what explains the intense "legitimacy anxiety"
about the application of international and foreign law here in America?
Why this national amnesia about our settled historical practice?
Let me suggest six reasons: First, the continuing interpretive debate over
originalism as a way of construing the Constitution. Second, a broader
societal debate after Brown v. Board of Education24 about the appropriate
judicial role and what Alexander Bickel famously called "the
countermajoritarian difficulty." 25 Third, a debate over what has been called
"American exceptionalism," 26 the idea that because America is an
exceptional country, it need not follow the same rules as everybody else.
Fourth, concerns that judicial constraints on the executive power will
inevitably subject us to problems and danger in the war on terror. Fifth, the
fear that on certain hot-button issues, like same-sex sodomy or the death
21. Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern lus Gentium, 119 HARV. L. REV.
129, 132 (2005).
22. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *66.
23. Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 12-87
(2006).
24. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
25. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT
THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-23 (1962).
26. See Harold Hongju Koh, Foreword: On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV.
1479, 1481 n.4 (2003).
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penalty, foreign and international law will be used by judges as an
illegitimate "tiebreaker," in a way that will allow them to impose their
values on a voting population. Finally, a jurisprudential objection-that
judges cannot find international values because those values do not exist,
except in the judges' own minds. Let me review and, in the end reject, each
of these objections.
First, the originalist objection: If originalists say that the only source to
which a judge is permitted to look is the Framers' original intent, then in
theory, you are not allowed to look to any sources that were not part of the
original interpretation. But here is the catch: If the Framers themselves
originally looked to foreign and international sources, then why does
looking to foreign and international sources pose a problem even for
originalists? It is surely strange to suggest that originalism somehow bars
judges from looking to anything other than the constitutional text, when, in
fact, the original Founders themselves, of course, looked to all kinds of
sources other than the text, including foreign and international law sources.
Second, what about the countermajoritarian difficulty? Here, the
argument goes, if judges place their fundamental values into the
Constitution through judicial interpretation, they effectively override the
will of elezted officials. But there is a democratic deficit that judges face
whether they are citing to international and foreign law or whether they are
just interpreting the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution to say that
equal treatment does not mean separate but equal. But on examination,
what is countermajoritarian is not the judges; it is the Constitution! The
Constitution by its nature is countermajoritarian, particularly when it
protects individual rights from being overridden by the will of the majority.
Judicial review to protect these individual rights is countermajoritarian.
And Marbury v. Madison makes clear that "[i]t is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is."27 So long as the
source of values that judges use to construe the Constitution is rooted in
legal principle, not personal preference, it is not clear why we face any
countermajoritarian problem in using those values to construe the
Constitution. What causes a countermajoritarian problem is if judges
choose to construe the Constitution based on personal preference and not
based on law.
The real complaint is therefore that allowing judges to construe the
Constitution in light of foreign law has the potential to elevate foreign law
into a higher place within the lexical hierarchy of American law than it is
entitled to occupy, above federal statute and above legislative change. But
the Supreme Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,28 makes clear
that customary international law is indeed federal common law. Although
there are some recent-and I believe incorrect-articles on the subject that
27. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
28. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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offer a dramatic misreading of the Sosa case, 29 in my view, the correct
reading of Sosa was recently offered by Judge William Fletcher of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, who observed: "[From Sosa], we
know-because the Supreme Court has told us-that there is a federal
common law of international human rights based on customary
international law." 30
Take the third objection, based on American exceptionalism, a topic on
which I have recently written. 31 Here the basic claim is that the United
States, as the world's most powerful nation, cannot be constrained by law
made by countries like Zimbabwe. You cannot take a poll of nations, said
Justice Alito in his confirmation hearing. 32 These countries, some would
say, claim to care about human rights, but follow them only in name. If we
started citing to foreign law, it would be only a matter of time before our
human rights standards were driven down to the lowest global common
denominator.
But this argument ignores an important difference between recognizing a
"margin of appreciation" for American interpretation of international
standards and a distinctly American interpretation that pushes
counterproductive double standards. No one objects to an American court
respecting the United States' distinctive legal culture by recognizing a
margin of appreciation for American constitutional rules, for example, in
the First Amendment's high protection of hate speech. What becomes
problematic is not the margin of appreciation, but the creation of a genuine
double standard. Only when there is a distinctly American interpretation
that creates a double standard that places the United States on the lower
rung does that lower interpretation conflict with universal principles of
human rights.
What about the fourth concern, regarding the war on terror? A new book
called The Terror Presidency33 by Jack Goldsmith, my friend, former
student, and teaching assistant, describes his extremely admirable recent
behavior as a lawyer in the Bush administration. Under intense political
pressure, Jack Goldsmith stood up for the rule of law against the White
House Counsel, the White House Chief of Staff, and the Vice President's
lawyer. As head of the U.S. Justice Department's Office of Legal Counsel,
Goldsmith, Deputy Attorney General Jim Comey, and Attorney General
John Ashcroft resisted as illegal a wiretap program that seemed squarely in
violation of enacted foreign intelligence surveillance law. For all of these
courageous actions, Professor Goldsmith deserves full credit.
29. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary
International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REv. 869 (2007).
30. William A. Fletcher, International Human Rights in American Courts, 93 VA. L.
REv. 653, 664 (2007).
31. E.g., Koh, supra note 26.
32. See Alito Confirmation Hearing, supra note 4, at 471.
33. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH
ADMINISTRATION (2007).
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But elsewhere in his book, there are some puzzling images. Take chapter
two, for example, which is entitled "The Commander-in-Chief Ensnared by
Law." Goldsmith suggests that we cannot have our Commander-in-Chief
"ensnared" by law--overlooking the fact that he happens to be
Commander-in-Chief only because of the law. At another point he writes,
Globalization and a more conservative Supreme Court motivated many in
the academic American left to replace the U.S. Constitution with
international human rights as the fount of progressivism. In the past
quarter century, various nations, NGOs, academics, international
organizations, and others in the "international community" have been
busily weaving a web of international laws and judicial institutions that
today threatens [U.S. government] interests.... Unless we tackle the
problem head-on, it will continue to grow. The issue is especially urgent
because of the unusual challenges we face in the war on terrorism. 34
Although Jack Goldsmith was plainly right in resisting the extreme
excesses of the Bush administration, that does not mean that all of his legal
views are correct. Let's look at two recent Supreme Court cases: in the
Hamdi case (in a separate opinion by Justice David Souter)35 and in
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Court invoked international law to reject the
government's claims that detainees are persons outside the law who can be
held in an extralegal zone called Guantdnamo, who could be subjected to
the jurisdiction of a noncourt, known as a military commission. 36 In
Hamdan, the Court found that the process provided fell short of the
international due process standards set forth in Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions. 37 Hamdan treated as universal a binding treaty
obligation in Common Article 3.38
In both cases, the U.S. government tried to argue that a clear dichotomy
exists between law and war. If we are in a war on terror, the government
seemed to suggest, "What's law got to do with it?" When we are at war,
law somehow goes out the window. But what this overlooks is that there is
no law/war dichotomy. There is an international law of war that has
existed for quite a while. And, as Justice Anthony Kennedy put it in
Hamdan, "If the military commission at issue is illegal under the law of
war, then an offender cannot be tried 'by the law of war' before that
commission. ' 39 In short, if you are going to invoke war as a rationale for
your authority, you must take the bitter with the sweet and accept the law of
34. Id. at 60.
35. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 539-54 (2004) (Souter, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment).
36. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2796 (2006).
37. See id. at 2794-98; see also Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
38. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798 ("Common Article 3 obviously tolerates a great degree
of flexibility in trying individuals captured during armed conflict; its requirements are
general ones, crafted to accommodate a wide variety of legal systems. But requirements
they are nonetheless.").
39. Id. at 2802 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
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war as a constraint as well. 40 Shortly after the Hamdan case came down, I
went to testify before the Senate Judiciary Committee. A senator said, "The
last time I checked, the terrorists had not signed Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions." I responded, in effect, that the last time I had
checked, the whales had not signed the Whaling Convention either! We
should understand that Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions is not
about them and who they are. It is about us and who we are. Common
Article 3 is not so much a contract, as it is a minimal universal standard
regarding humane treatment-affecting how we treat people we detain and,
more fundamentally, how we are obliged to treat detainees when we act
within a community of reason and rights.
A fifth objection to the legitimacy of using foreign and international law
concerns "hot-button" social issues. The core claim is that American
Justices cannot use international and foreign law as tiebreakers to reach
legal conclusions that comport with their own policy preferences, for
example, with regard to the death penalty or same-sex sodomy. But it is not
at all clear that international and foreign law are in fact being used as such a
tiebreaker. For example, look at Roper, where, by a vote of 5-4, the
majority said that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbade the
execution of offenders who were under eighteen at the time of the offense. 41
Significantly, the Court did not say that it was breaking the tie by looking to
foreign and international law. Instead, the Court said that it was
interpreting the Eighth Amendment in light of prevailing American
practice,42 which
finds confirmation in the stark reality that the United States is the only
country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile
death penalty. This reality does not become controlling, for the task of
interpreting the Eighth Amendment remains our responsibility....
... The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our
outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own
conclusions.
4 3
In short, in looking to foreign and international practice, the Court is not
seeking to use that practice to break a tie; it is only seeking confirmation in
the practices of others for a trend that it has found already developing
within the United States.
The sixth and final-the jurisprudential-objection asserts that foreign
and international law cannot be cited in a principled way. But surely the
40. See id.
41. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
42. See id. at 564-67 (explaining that the "evidence of national consensus against the
death penalty for juveniles is similar, and in some respects parallel, to the evidence Atkins
held sufficient to demonstrate a national consensus against the death penalty for the mentally
retarded").
43. Id. at 575, 578 (emphasis added).
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same could be claimed about any circumstance where a judge applies
choice of law rules to any choice of law situation. In nearly all such cases,
judges apply legal rules from other jurisdictions to bind citizens of their
own jurisdiction. All other things being equal, choice of law rules help to
ensure that judges will decide like cases alike, unless local necessity or
public policy demand otherwise. This is especially true when U.S. law does
not stand alone, but increasingly (with a margin of appreciation) forms part
of a global body of international human rights law. At base, there is
nothing illegitimate about choosing a legal interpretation that is consistent
with human rights law, so long as judges adopt such interpretations through
a process of transparent legal reasoning that seeks to determine whether
there is a clear and genuine consensus within a community of reason and
rights as to what the global norm is.
There can be little doubt that this is a rapidly growing issue. In its last
five Terms, the Supreme Court has had nearly two dozen cases involving
international and foreign law issues, in a whole range of areas-9/11,44 the
Alien Tort Claims Act,45 foreign sovereign immunity,46 extraterritoriality, 47
immigration, 48 NAFTA,49 federal criminal statutes,50 the death penalty,51
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 52 treaty issues,53 and
transnational discovery.5 4 These cases are clearly not going away any time
soon. These cases involve four kinds of judicial interpretation:
interpretation of the Constitution, statutes, treaties, and customary
international law. Statutory interpretation can either involve direct
incorporation of international law into a statute-as in the case of the Alien
Tort Claims Act, which by its own terms mentions "torts in violation of the
law of nations," and the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which
44. See, e.g., Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008); Munafv. Geren, 128 S. Ct.
2207 (2008), reh 'g denied, No. 07-394, 2008 WL 3822186 (U.S. Aug. 18, 2008); Hamdan,
126 S. Ct. 2749; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466
(2004); Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004).
45. See, e.g., Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
46. See, e.g., Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677 (2004); Dole Food Co. v.
Patrickson, 538 U.S. 468 (2003).
47. See, e.g., Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd., 545 U.S. 119 (2005); F. Hoffman-
La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
48. See, e.g., Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005); Jama v. Immigration & Customs
Enforcement, 543 U.S. 335 (2005).
49. See, e.g., Dep't of Transp. v. Pub. Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004).
50. See, e.g., Small v. United States, 544 U.S. 385 (2005); Pasquantino v. United States,
544 U.S. 349 (2005).
51. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
52. See, e.g., Medellin v. Texas, Nos. 06-984, 08-5573, 08-5574, 2008 WL 3821478
(U.S. Aug. 5, 2008) (per curiam); Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008); Sanchez-
Llamas v. Oregon, 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006); Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (per
curiam).
53. See, e.g., Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct.
1211 (2006) (United Nations Convention on Psychotropic Substances); Olympic Airways v.
Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004) (Warsaw Convention).
54. See, e.g., Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241 (2004).
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mentions taking of property "in violation of international law"-or indirect
incorporation through the time-honored Charming Betsy principle. 55
I have argued in a number of places that we are now seeing a Supreme
Court that is divided between two judicial camps: the transnationalists and
nationalists.5 6 The swing Justice, as he seems to be on everything, is
Justice Kennedy. What are the key differences between the judicial
philosophies of these two groups?
" Transnationalist judges tend to look to U.S. interdependence,
whereas nationalist judges tend to look to U.S. autonomy.
* Transnationalist judges think about how U.S. law fits into a
framework of transnational law, while nationalists see a rigid
foreign and domestic divide.
* Transnationalist judges think that courts can domesticate
international law, whereas nationalists think that only the
political branches are legally empowered to do so.
" Transnationalist judges look to the development of a global legal
system, while nationalists tend to focus more narrowly on the
development of a national legal system.
* Transnationalist judges believe that executive power can be
constrained by comity amongst the courts, while nationalists
believe acts of executive discretion enjoy great deference.
The transnational tradition in American jurisprudence is a strong and
enduring one. It runs through Chief Justices John Marshall and John Jay,
whom I have mentioned; through Justice Horace Gray, who wrote the
Paquete Habana case and Hilton v. Guyot;57 through Chief Justices
Melville Fuller and William Howard Taft, who helped to found the
American Society of International Law; to Justice William 0. Douglas, who
traveled the world to an extent unmatched by any current justice; to Justice
William Brennan, who was a strong internationalist on the Warren Court; to
Justice Byron White, who wrote a stirring transnationalist dissent in the
Sabbatino case; 58 to Justices Stephen Breyer and Ruth Bader Ginsburg
today, joined by Justices John Paul Stevens and David Souter, and at times
by Justice Anthony Kennedy and, when she sat on the Court, Justice Sandra
Day O'Connor; and to the Justice for whom I had the privilege of clerking,
Harry Blackmun, who articulated an important transnationalist canon for
U.S. judges. Recall the Charming Betsy's transnationalist canon of
statutory interpretation: when you have two possible ways to interpret an
55. Murray v. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 67 (1804) ("[I]t has also been
observed that an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remains .... ").
56. See, e.g., HAROLD HONGJu KOH, TRANSNATIONAL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES
COURTS 347-60 (2008).
57. 159U.S. 113 (1895).
58. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 439-72 (1964) (White, J.,
dissenting).
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act of Congress, you should construe it to be consistent with international
law, if at all possible. 59  In other words, if there are two possible
interpretations of a statute, and one comports with international law, that is
the one that you should follow. The canon follows from the self-evident
point that deliberately adopting a statutory interpretation that is inconsistent
with international law assumes that Congress legislated with an intent to
bring our law into conflict with that of other nations.
In his judicial opinions, Justice Blackmun suggested a broader
transnational canon for the age of globalization that potentially covers the
Constitution as well. In the Adrospatiale case, he suggested that domestic
courts should look beyond the United States' immediate interests to the
"mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly functioning international legal
regime," 60 urging judges
to consider if there is a course that furthers, rather than impedes, the
development of an ordered international system. A functioning system
for solving disputes across borders serves many values, among them
predictability, fairness, ease of commercial interactions, and stability
through satisfaction of mutual expectations. These interests are common
to all nations, including the United States.61
What this suggests-and this is my proposed canon-is that when a U.S.
judge is faced with an interpretive question regarding a provision of the
Constitution, he or she should construe the provision in a manner most
consistent with the modem jus gentium, which is a clear consensus of a
legal community of reason and human rights.
Let me give three examples. History suggests that over the years, the
Court has regularly looked to foreign and international precedents as an aid
to constitutional interpretation in at least three situations, which for
simplicity's sake I have elsewhere called "parallel rules," "empirical light,"
and "community standards."'62 First, the Court has noted when American
legal rules seem to parallel those of other nations, particularly those with
similar legal and social traditions. As the Court has repeatedly recognized,
the concept of "ordered liberty" is not uniquely American but, rather, is
"enshrined" in the legal history of "English-speaking peoples," as well as
other legal systems.63 In Lawrence, the Supreme Court acknowledged that
59. The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) at 67.
60. Socit6 Nationale Industrielle A~rospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 555
(1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
61. Id. at 567 (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
62. See Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L L.
43,45 (2004), on which the discussion that follows is based.
63. See, e.g., Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 n.42 (1977) (quoting Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28 (1949)); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 488 n.59, 521-22
(1966) (quoting from a 1954 decision by the Lord Justice General of India and citing
experiences in other countries); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 167 (1955) (finding a
practice "supported by long-standing tradition here and in other English-speaking nations");
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (writing that the Due Process Clause obliges
courts to ascertain whether a given law or practice offends "those canons of decency and
fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples"). More recently,
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the concept of privacy is not American property, unique to the United
States, but rather, part of a privacy concept recognized and shared in other
countries in the world. 64 In asking a question under U.S. law-whether
there is a compelling governmental interest in preventing people from
having sex with same-sex partners-the Lawrence Court found that the
claimed compelling governmental interest had not been found elsewhere, in
countries with whom we arguably shared a common heritage of privacy.
Second, as Justice Breyer recently noted, the "Court has long considered
as relevant and informative the way in which foreign courts have applied
standards roughly comparable to our own constitutional standards in
roughly comparable circumstances." 65  In Printz v. United States, he
elaborated, "Of course, we are interpreting our own Constitution, not those
of other nations, and there may be relevant political and structural
differences between their systems and our own. But their experience may
nonetheless cast an empirical light on the consequences of different
solutions to a common legal problem .... ,"66 In effect, Justice Breyer asks,
If somebody else has considered a constitutional question before, why
shouldn't U.S. courts look to what those countries have decided to
determine whether or not the sister country's solution has led to a good
outcome? Again, this is looking out over a crowd and doing what your
smart friends do.
Third, the Court has looked outside the United States when an American
constitutional concept, by its own terms, implicitly refers to a community
standard--e.g., "cruel and unusual," "due process of law,". "unreasonable
searches and seizures." In such cases, the Court has recognized that the
United States is not the only relevant community to be consulted. For
example, in deciding whether a particular punishment has become both
"cruel and unusual," the Court has long taken notice of foreign and
international practice to evaluate how "unusual" the practice has become. 67
In Trop v. Dulles, the Court specifically held that the Eighth Amendment to
the U.S. Constitution contains "evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society." 68 And in subsequent cases, the Court made
clear that this "evolving standard" should be measured by reference not just
the Court has spoken more broadly about "civilized societies," without regard to the
particular language they may speak. See, e.g., Ford v. Wainright, 477 U.S. 399, 409 (1986)
(noting "the natural abhorrence civilized societies feel at killing one who has no capacity to
come to grips with his own conscience or deity").
64. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572-73, 576-77 (2003).
65. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 997 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
66. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added) (citations omitted).
67. For a catalogue of decisions, see generally Harold Hongju Koh, Paying "Decent
Respect" to World Opinion on the Death Penalty, 35 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 1085, 1118-19 &
n. 140 (2002).
68. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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to maturing American experience, but to foreign and international
experience as well.69
What are the "evolving standards of human decency" to which Trop v.
Dulles refers? My suggestion would be to look to the global community of
reason and rights in determining whether a particular practice of
punishment may now be deemed to be "unusual." For example, in an
amicus brief we submitted in the Atkins case about the execution of persons
with mental retardation, we pointed out that only certain states of the United
States and Kyrgyzstan executed persons with mental retardation. 70 The
next day, the New York Times printed a letter to the editor from the
ambassador of Kyrgyzstan, pointing out that his country had actually placed
a moratorium on the death penalty. 71 That meant that only certain states of
the United States continued to have this form of punishment on the books,
and that even fewer states of the United States actually ever executed
persons with mental retardation. I would submit that, in a world of more
than 190 countries, if only part of one country persists in a particular
punishment, that punishment is "unusual," and perhaps even "cruel and
unusual," which would render it a violation of the Eighth Amendment,
which is what the Court held in Atkins.
In conclusion, let me suggest that if judges follow the transnationalist
canon that I suggest, based on a notion of a community of reason and rights,
it cuts the Gordian knot. It answers all six "legitimacy" objections to the
use of foreign and international law that I have enumerated above.
First, take originalism: As the late John Hart Ely recognized, originalism
must mean more than simply following tradition. As Ely wrote, "[I]n this
country ... there are all sorts of traditions .... Lynching is a tradition....
Keeping blacks from voting is a tradition. '72 Just because a practice is a
tradition does not mean it is always part of our Constitution. Originalism
does not oblige us to follow traditions that don't meet the highest standards
of mankind, which is what the Framers more broadly intended. Thus, in
69. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (plurality opinion)
(evaluating whether death penalty for fifteen-year-old offenders violates Eighth
Amendment's "civilized standards of decency" in part by looking to the prohibition of the
execution of minors by the Soviet Union and nations of Western Europe); Enmund v.
Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982) ("[T]he doctrine of felony murder has been abolished
in England and India, severely restricted in Canada and a number of other Commonwealth
countries, and is unknown in continental Europe."); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596
n. 10 (1977) (finding international practices regarding death penalty for rape relevant to its
"evolving standards" analysis).
70. See Brief of Amici Curiae Diplomats Morton Abramowitz et al. in Support of
Petitioner, McCarver v. North Carolina, 533 U.S. 975 (2001) (No. 00-8727), 2001 WL
648607. The amicus brief was later refiled in Atkins v. Virginia. See Joint Motion of All
Amici in McCarver v. North Carolina, No. 00-8727, to Have Their McCarver Amicus Briefs
Considered in This Case in Support of Petitioner, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(No. 00-8452), 2001 WL 1682012.
71. Baktybek Abdrisaev, Letter to the Editor, Penalties in Kyrgyzstan, N.Y. TIMES, June
30, 2001, at A14 ("[I]t is the policy of [Kyrgyzstan's] executive branch not to impose the
death penalty for any crime or in any circumstance.").
72. JOHN HART ELY, ON CONSTITUTIONAL GROUND 21 (1996).
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applying the transnationalist canon, modem judges would be following
originalist Justices, such as John Marshall and John Jay, who similarly
construed constitutional principles in light of jus gentium, an originalism
based on reason and rights. If you look again at Sarah Cleveland's article
regarding the history of our courts' use of foreign and international law,73
you will see that the transnationalist canon explains much of our doctrine;
courts have traditionally used international law as a background principle of
constitutional construction and as a background principle for construing
individual rights provisions of the Constitution.
Second, what about the countermajoritarian difficulty? Some Americans
may not like independent judges citing to judges from other countries or
courts to determine the relationship between national and international
norms. But does anybody complain when expert and independent U.S.
central bankers, like Alan Greenspan or Ben Bemanke, engage in dialogue
with other central bankers and the IMF to set international monetary
standards? In both cases, there are rules in the international arena that the
United States helps to shape and make. The concern about the democratic
deficit is ameliorated by the dominant role that U.S. government officials
play in making those rules. The question Americans tend to ask about U.S.
monetary policy, which is heavily influenced by international monetary
policy, is not whether those rules suffer from a democratic deficit, but
whether those monetary rules reflect the thinking of a global community of
reason and rights: namely, do they comport with an international rule of
economic reason that adequately respects the rights of U.S. nationals? 74
Remember that the antimajoritarian difficulty results not from judicial
review, but from the source of the values used to construe the Constitution,
and whether they are rooted in personal preference or legal principle. If the
Constitution is construed against a background of reason and rights, like
other choice-of-law reasoning, it remains rooted both in judicial tradition
and in legal doctrine that is sensitive to the compatibility of U.S. legal
principles with international principles.
Third, does applying the transnationalist canon reduce concerns about
American exceptionalism? Yes, but it leaves a margin of appreciation for
distinctly American values and for those U.S. constitutional norms that are
particularly embedded in U.S. values and traditions (e.g., greater tolerance
73. See generally Cleveland, supra note 23.
74. As Justice Breyer put it in his 2003 speech to the American Society of International
law,
[T]he transnational law that is being created is not simply a product of treaty-
writers, legislatures, or courts. We in America know full well that in a democracy,
law, perhaps most law, is not decreed from on high but bubbles up from the
interested publics, affected groups, specialists, legislatures, and others, all
interacting through meetings, journal articles, the popular press, legislative
hearings, and in many other ways. That is the democratic process in action.
Stephen Breyer, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the Ninety-
Seventh Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Apr. 4, 2003), in 97
AM. SOc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 265, 268 (2003) (emphasis added).
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for hate speech). At the same time, the transnationalist canon would allow
judges to construe the Constitution to invalidate domestic rules that now
violate clearly established international norms, such as systematic race
discrimination as an offense to equality. But in cases where there is no
clearly established international human rights norm, for example, in the area
of abortion, the canon simply would not apply.
Fourth, what about the war on terror objection? Here, one should ask
what threatens our national interests more-when U.S. judges construe U.S.
law according to international and foreign standards or when the United
States presses an interpretation which is clearly a double standard, for
example, applying practices of torture and cruel treatment in detention that
do not comply with the Torture Convention or with Geneva Convention,
Common Article 3? Here I am struck by Jack Goldsmith's final verdict on
the Bush administration at the end of his book, The Terror Presidency: in
the war on terror, President Bush
has been almost entirely inattentive to the soft factors of legitimation-
consultation, deliberation, the appearance of deference, and credible
expressions of public concern for constitutional and international values.
•.. [a]nd he has seen his hard power diminished•., because he has failed
to take the softer aspects of power seriously. 75
I agree entirely. But isn't that a reason why judges, and not just politicians,
should be mindful of these international values, particularly when executive
officials are not?
Fifth, what about the "illegitimate tiebreaker" argument? Again, a
famous canon of statutory construction that we all know grew out of a
famous concurring opinion by Justice Louis Brandeis in Ashwander v.
Tennessee Valley Authority, which said that if there are two competing
interpretations of a statute, one of which violates the Constitution, you must
choose the constitutional interpretation. 76  That is, in effect, what the
majority did in Roper. There were two possible interpretations. The Court
found that the one that was most consistent with international and foreign
norms confirmed their outcome.77  The Roper majority chose the
interpretation that comported with international and foreign norms, finding
that those norms, "while not controlling our [legal] outcome . . . provide
respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions." 78
Sixth and finally, what about the jurisprudential objection, noted above,
that a U.S. judge cannot find international human rights rules without
imposing his or her own personal preferences? The Supreme Court
effectively rejected this argument only a few years ago, in the Sosa case,
where the majority instructed judges to look to "norm[s] of international
75. GOLDSMITH, supra note 33, at 215 (emphasis added).
76. Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring) (citing Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523, 538 (1911); Siler v. Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175, 191 (1909)).
77. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005).
78. Id. at 578.
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character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the eighteenth-century paradigms we have
recognized. '79 This suggests that where international human rights rules
are clear, they are fully capable of being found by U.S. judges, and they are
doing so every day, in the context of Alien Tort Claims Act cases.
What about the "Zimbabwe objection"--that judicial reference to foreign
and international norms will drive our law down to the lowest global
common denominator? That is a bit like saying that the fact that we have
federal minimum constitutional standards will drive every state of the
Union down to the lowest available standard for rights. But as Justice
Brennan noted in his famous article on state courts and constitutions and
individual rights, 80 state courts always retain the freedom to maintain higher
constitutional standards for their state, just as the United States remains free
to construe our Constitution to give more protection under our Constitution
for practices such as incendiary speech.
And what about Zimbabwe? On reflection, modem U.S. judges are no
more obliged to follow Robert Mugabe than early American judges were
obliged to follow the practices of the Barbary pirates. In the 1700s, the
Barbary pirates neither satisfiedjus gentium nor did their practices meet the
standards of a global community of reason and rights. Today, neither do
the practices of Mugabe. We do not have to construe our Constitution to
descend to Zimbabwe's level, if it is below our floor. Like state supreme
courts in a federal system, the U.S. Supreme Court remains free in a global
legal system to construe the U.S. Constitution, in light of our constitutional
traditions, to require greater protections than the international human rights
"floor" may require.
In conclusion, I have made three arguments. First, judicial interpretation
of the Constitution in light of international and foreign law is nothing more
or less than choice of law, guided by a canon of constitutional interpretation
that I call the transnationalist interpretation. In choosing among two
competing interpretations of a constitutional provision, a judge should
construe the provision in a manner most consistent with a clear view of a
global community of reason and rights, if such a view exists.
Second, in doing so, the judge is entitled to look over a crowd and pick
out her friends. If your "friends" include persuasive law review articles
written by publicists, that happens to be a subsidiary source of international
law under Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 81 If
those sources are foreign and international decisions, or instruments of
foreign law, it is not illegitimate to cite them, so long as they grapple with
the issue within a framework of reason and rights and cast light on
79. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
80. William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights,
90 HARV. L. REv. 489 (1977).
81. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(b), 59 Stat.
1055, 1060.
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community standards, parallel rules, or empirical lessons from other legal
systems.
Third, notice that in seeking these other opinions, the judge is not asking
her friends to decide the case! She is simply seeking confirmation of which
of the two competing interpretations is the one that more closely comports
with the view of a global community of reason and rights, looking to
reasoned, enlightened views drawn from parallel experiences.
So I may not consider your views about this lecture to be binding, but I
do want to know what they are, and I promise I will listen to your
comments. If you make a point that causes me to reconsider, my analysis
will be sharpened. As my predecessor as Yale Law School's Dean, Guido
Calabresi, now in the Second Circuit once wrote, "Wise parents do not
hesitate to learn from their children." 82 By the same token, wise speakers
do not hesitate to learn from their audiences.
Let me close with a final story from Kosovo. In 1999, after the NATO
bombing, I went to Pristina, Kosovo's capital, to support the re-creation of
judicial institutions. We brought to that war-torn country's abandoned
courthouses equipment, computers, metal detectors, and computerized
docket systems. But Kosovo lacked one thing necessary for the
administration of justice-judges. The judges had all fled to refugee camps
in Albania and Macedonia. By the time I arrived, the United Nations
mission had gathered a group of lawyers from the old Kosovo and asked
me, "Mr. Assistant Secretary, we would like you to swear these judges in."
But then the question arose, What do we swear them on? We could not
swear them all on the Bible. Why? Because most of the Albanians were
Muslims. Yet we could not swear them all on the Qur'an. Why? Because
the Serbs were Serbian Orthodox. We could not swear them under
Albanian law, because the Kosovars were not citizens of Albania. And we
could not swear them under Serbian law, because the Kosovars deemed that
to be the law of the oppressor. So what law must they follow? I turned to
the waiting judges-to-be, and somebody said, "Mr. Secretary, you have to
make a decision."
I said, "All right. Bring out a Qur'an, a Bible, the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights
and Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and the European Convention
on Human Rights. If they are going to be judges, all of them from different
backgrounds, perhaps it makes sense that they swear an oath to a global
community of reason and rights." And one by one, they took the oath. It
was one of the most touching things I have ever seen.
Did they, after that, as judges, have interpretive authority over their own
constitutional law? They surely did. Were they unfettered in exercising
their judicial authority? Absolutely not. Were they construing only
domestic law? They were construing domestic law in reference to the jus
gentium. It would have been anachronistic in that case to adhere solely to
82. United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995).
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domestic law. After all, they were entering a world where we all hoped that
their similarities would be greater than their differences. We asked them to
construe their law tempered by reason and with an awareness of rights. By
that vehicle, they were authorized to declare law as part of their legitimate
judicial function. The hope and expectation of every lawyer in that room
was that Kosovo's new judges would build a body of law that would make
them a respected member of the global community.
And, I thought, if this is good for the Kosovars, why doesn't it apply
equally to us? When the Kosovars declare their independence, will they
say, "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all [persons] are created
equal,.., with certain unalienable Rights," among them "Life, Liberty, and
the Pursuit of Happiness"? 83 Will they make reference to the body of
human rights law that has developed since 1776? Will they say that in
becoming independent, they will pay "decent respect to the opinions of
mankind" 84 as part of joining the community of the law of nations? And
will they learn the key lesson of the global human rights revolution, which
is simply this: that we need domestic judges to participate in the making of
a world governed by human rights by viewing their role, not only as
citizens of their own particular country, but as part of a broader global
community of reason and rights?
Thank you very much.
DEAN TREANOR: We will take two questions.
What a magnificent speech.
Martin Flaherty?
QUESTIONER: That not only made my day; it made my year.
I cannot bring myself to ask a devil's advocate question, so let me make
this comment. Another objection to originalism-and I am not sure how
much it complements or differs from yours-is that many of the Justices,
including Justice Scalia, make their opposition to the use of international
comparative law on originalist grounds: "We the people" did not want it.
You have shown that that is wrong.
But even if we could not tell, there is another objection. It goes to the
objection that international law and comparative law are too hard to follow.
Basically, if that is true, how much more-
DEAN KOH: And ERISA is not?
QUESTIONER: And my point is: And the founding is not? You are
trying to figure out what people 200 years ago said, discerning it from
twenty volumes of ratification debates-pamphlets, history, whatever. Talk
about picking and choosing, and trying to find your friends or not.
Why is that okay-in fact, not only is that okay; that is dispositive-but
looking to international sources for confirmation or, at most, a kind of
Charming Betsy tiebreaker is unthinkable? I do not see how the same
83. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
84. Id. para. 1.
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judicial mind can have both thoughts at once: History is dispositive, but
international law cannot be consulted at all.
DEAN KOH: John Hart Ely has two books that a lot of people have
read, Democracy and Distrust85 and War and Responsibility.86 But there is
a third book that came out not long before he died, which is called On
Constitutional Ground.87 I love John Hart Ely. I love the way he writes.
But the great thing about On Constitutional Ground is that it actually put
together a lot of little essays he wrote. One of them was a speech he gave in
Canada at the exact time that he was writing the chapter of Democracy and
Distrust on how you discover fundamental values in the Constitution. He
says, "Do judges in the United States find fundamental values the same way
the Canadians do?" 88
He started talking about originalism and arguments from tradition. He
said that the problem with these arguments from tradition and originalism is
that one side says, "You know, gays can't commit sodomy." Why?
"Because our originalism is all about heterosexuality." But the obvious
response is, "There is a tradition in America, more than in other countries-
because the United States is a secular society-of sexual freedom."
Therefore, people in the United States do all kinds of things as part of a
tradition of liberal sexual freedom. So you could invoke "tradition" to
cover either side of this equation. From which Ely concludes that, since
originalism and tradition are malleable, and since there must be some
method by which you accept or reject certain practices, like lynching or
preventing black people from voting, as part of the tradition to which we
give respect, you actually need some filtering principle.
What I am offering here is a simple principle, which is that you look to
those traditions that pass muster within a global community of reason and
rights. In fact, that is what our Court has been doing for many years. Some
of my colleagues, Akhil Amar, Jack Balkin, and other scholars say, "What
about progressive originalism? Maybe we should think of originalism as an
evolving, not a static, originalism." In Trop v. Dulles, when the Supreme
Court said that the Eighth Amendment shall be construed according to
"evolving standards of [human] decency," 89 it was adopting a standard that
it thought was originalist; it just happened to include a bar on punishments
that were "cruel and unusual" by contemporary standards.
QUESTIONER: First of all, this is incredibly inspiring.
But there is a difference, it seems to me, between the world now and the
tradition of this, even in American law. I think that there are fewer lawyers
and judges educated in these things before they have to make decisions
85. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(1980).
86. JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM
AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993).
87. ELY, supra note 72.
88. See id. at 18-24.
89. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958).
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based on them. You see this with some of the war on terror decisions.
There are canons of interpretation in international law that are just the ones
from American law used on different texts. These sources actually come
with traditions in which there are many fewer people educated now than
used to be the case in the United States, I thirk.
So that is one kind of problem.
The other kind of problem is that many of the sources that would be
extremely useful are, of course, not in English. I think many people in the
United States speak relatively few languages, and there is relatively little
translation being done of decisions of some of the key comparative law
courts that we might want to look at.
So there is a kind of education issue here, about whether these sources
are really as accessible as they used to be, I think. When you look at how
foreign and international law were used by previous judges, a lot of them
knew a lot more.
This could be a dean question about what we do about legal education.
But it could also be a question about what kinds of sources can be used if,
in fact, not all of those using them may be fully educated in the traditions
thereof.
DEAN KOH: The first point strikes me as a self-fulfilling prophecy:
Because our judges are uneducated about these matters, they cannot be
trusted to look at foreign and international law, which vindicates being
uneducated. That was, by the way, an argument frequently made for
application of the political question doctrine. Judges do not know anything
about politics, so they should never decide the cases that include political
questions. Then, when they never decide such cases, they will never know
anything about them. Therefore, they must be nonjusticiable political
questions-even when the words involved in such cases are terms fully
subject to legal analysis, like "war" or "national emergency."
When you and I went to law school, it may be that few of the law schools
in America were aggressively teaching international law or transnational
law. But is that the case now? Is there any law student in this country who
does not communicate internationally every day by sending messages
through the Internet? My view on this is, maybe we are catching up. What
the war on terror taught us was that not that many people knew about
humanitarian law, as opposed to human rights law. But now they do.
Americans now know about humanitarian law. Everybody in the country
has heard about the Geneva Conventions now.
On the accessibility question, it is true that English is the universal
language. That happens to be our language. Can somebody realistically
say that it is harder for us now to translate foreign law than it was for John
Marshall at the beginning of the Republic? In fact, it is infinitely easier,
more accessible and more available. People of reason and people who write
about rights-including constitutional court judges-now regularly put
their writings online, and in English.
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So I think the opposite is actually true. Technologically, foreign and
international law are far more accessible now than they were in the past. Is
there any significant tribunal in the world that is not putting its decisions
online in English? So the notions that we cannot know or find this foreign
law no longer hold water, particularly the more we have conferences like
this one.
DEAN TREANOR: That's terrific. Thank you very much, Dean Koh,
for a fabulous talk.
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